On the Party's development - The necessity of reinforcement and the upcoming duties

KKE in an upward course

12. Following the 1991 crisis, throughout its reorganization process, especially after the 16th Congress, KKE has constantly been confronted with adverse, and to a certain extent newly met, conditions. However it has successfully managed to impose its persistent, autonomous, political presence and activity, equipped by its strong weapon: its thoroughly developed strategy and policy, confirmed by life itself, as well as its readiness to defend all working people's interests.

It has achieved the ability to sustain itself against turmoil, to exercise serious influence - through its vanguard role - in organizing social rallies, preventing the movement's retreat and the total alienation of consciousness, as well.

After the 16th Congress, KKE has developed a more intense and steady political intervention. It has exercised an increasing influence within the ranks of the mass movement, on a broader range of issues, comparing the objective interrelation among the questions of economy, social development and democratic issues which our people face given our country's political and military dependence on the European Union and NATO; the threats against our territorial integrity and our country's sovereign rights. It has also brought up and promoted the real context of patriotism and internationalism, as opposing concepts to nationalism and cosmopolitan capital. It has confronted the effort to destroy the militant cultural inheritance that educates and builds consciousness and also becomes an example for all people.

It has broadened its influence in subjects scarcely touched in the past, especially recently into the issues of culture and sports, modern construction infrastructure and all aspects related to the Olympic Games.

It has openly proceeded into a number of political initiatives around mobilization and gathering of forces which set the preconditions for the formation of the AADF. It has supported or initiated the expression of common activity and cooperation on social and political issues, whenever the government attacked working people or enforced new restrictive measures. During the election periods, a number of initiatives were taken, through the formation of broader voting lists and support committees.

The mobilization in the trade union movement, the farmers' movement, the anti-war- anti-imperialist struggle, for democratic liberties against the strategy of pre-emptive antiterrorist strikes and the alleged antiterrorist legislation constituted important sources of resistance and common action by the people's vanguard forces. They have become the counterforce to the compromising leadership of the upper ranks in the movement. They have contributed to us promoting common activity of various forces engaged in different political parties.

All these mobilizations have not been equally developed and have not shared the same dynamic pace in their course. They are not governed by systematic planning and organization nor a steady effort to broaden their ranks This can be interpreted- to a great extent- by the inability of those popular forces engaged in the process to free themselves of the burden imposed by the negative balance of forces. They have not yet integrated -to a necessary extent- the logic of confrontation and rupture; they haven't perceived or become convinced of the need for a more stable structure, the process of movement building, a procedure toward the establishment of the AADF.

In some cases, these mobilizations, as immediate popular expressions are framed in a very hasty context, under the pressure of upcoming elections, local and regional.

Other political forces, adverse to alliances that fight back or have the potential in due course to reach the point of an eventual rupture with the dominant policy and the EU's doctrines, have been confronting KKE's policy on coalition-building and mobilizing forces in different fields. Such intervention in some cases has led to confusions and delusions spread to militants and vanguard representatives on the question of what alliance to form and on what cause.

Our party has confronted this attack by establishing an ideological and political front based on two patterns tracing Greek society's evolution and development: one serving the multinationals and capitalists' interests, declaring integration and blind obedience to the anti-labour choices dictated by the EU and NATO, at the people's expense; and the other one of establishing an Anti-imperialist Anti-monopoly Democratic Front, offering possibilities to the working class, the lower middle class strata in the town or countryside and the youth.

Dealing with the absence of permanent support on a number of Party's initiatives by the Party Base Organizations [PBOs] and the regional or local boards, has been one of the obstacles KKE has been constantly facing during the process of building a front or mobilizing forces; in many cases, support was circumstantial, lacking any future perspective or design, serving only limited or immediate political needs. This problem does not start from below, from the PBOs. It reflects a deficit in guidance by the leading bodies of the Party, the Central Committee's [CC] and especially the leading bodies at the level of Cities Districts and Regional Organizations ones as well as the prefectural organizations. Despite any recent noticeable positive steps, such a degree of improvement cannot yet respond to the perplexity and the importance of such a duty.

KKE has developed and gradually enforced its political and ideological front against the mainstream of compromise and defeatism; against the new trends of opportunism, founded and supported by the mechanisms and the ruling class parties, international imperialism and its "arsenal" aiming at obstructing the development of an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly and anti-capitalist consciousness.

The stronger the ideological and political activity of KKE become, the more influential its political proposal is proven to be and thus made more appealing, compared to the past.

KKE has deployed its ideological and political arsenal against all reactionary as well as utopic theories in the so called "national vision on the convergence of Greece as a powerful member of the EU's hard core", and "competitiveness". Such aspects do consciously and purposely disregard the law of uneven development, the intra-imperialist contradictions and conflicts, the unequal relations developed within the boundaries of international imperialism and its regional interstate institutions. They aim at entrapping the people's forces, and neutralizing class struggle.

Throughout these years, the party has gradually experienced and analyzed national and international developments. It has progressively developed and elaborated its documents and proposals on the crucial current political, financial and social questions.

From a class point of view and to a quite satisfactory degree, it has reached its general conclusions on social and economic developments, the strategy and the ambitions of the ruling class to impose adjustments within the bourgeois political system, in order to integrate the masses and their movements. The Party's critical political statements have been proven influential to other Parties' supporters, as well; KKE's influence has been expanded, and a vanguard pole appears move visible in the society. It has become obvious that the groundwork has been laid for the mobilizing of forces in joint action. Issues that the Party has stressed for years, such as the people's living standards, our democratic freedoms, the direction of the Greek and European economies, the intra-imperialist contradictions and the imperialist war, the EU and NATO's nature and choices are now becoming more and more appealing and initiate broader discussions and debates.

Within the last two years, especially after its 16th Congress, KKE has firmly and courageously presented before the people the issue of the struggle for the establishment of a people's power and economy, the need of our country's disengagement form EU; the issue of socializing the basic means of production, the question of people's control over cooperatives; the issue of a totally different direction toward the unification of Europe, for a Europe of people's rights, the Europe of socialism.

The Party has been firmly and painstakingly engaged in supporting the Communist Youth (KNE) restructuring process, as the latter was severely affected by the 1991 crisis. Today, the KNE has a massive membership; its activity constitutes a positive political element for the popular and especially the youth movement in our country.

KKE's positive role has expanded to broader fields of ideas, aspirations and concepts, in a historical period, where disappointment and defeatism confusion, fear, distrust in people's power, as well a hesitation for an overall conflict and rupture set critical obstacles in the development and sharpening of the class struggle.

The KKE has combined its actions on the national level with its active intervention and initiatives on the European and International one, through the establishment of an annual International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties; through the enforcement of bilateral relations, its immediate contacts and participation in international mobilizations.

The KKE has been particularly focused on the development of a demanding movement of solidarity with peoples facing imperialist aggression and intervention. It has strongly and actively emphasized its support for the resolution of the Cyprus question as an international issue of invasion and occupation and not as problem that regards the two communities.

KKE opposed the Anan Plan, supporting a federal bi-zonal, bi-communal solution, with one and sole single sovereignty, and single international personality. It has expressed its solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Palestinian People for an independent and sovereign state with East Jerusalem as its capital, according to the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Having as starting point the first conclusions drawn in the National Party's Conference in 1995 on the objective and the subjective causes and factors which led to the overthrow of the socialist regimes in Europe as stated, KKE defends the historical effort of the 20th Century to build socialism, its contribution to the working class achievements, the struggle for peace, the national liberation movements. At the same time, it has highlighted mistakes and deviations that, within a historical context of imperialist surrounding, gave impetus to counter- revolution's victory.

The demand for the Party's overall ideological, political and organizational strengthening is still an unfulfilled duty, according both to the initial guidelines of KKE's reorganization and the increasing demands of current developments.

The 14th congress - the starting point of the Party's reorganization process

13 The 14th Congress emphasized that the Party's reorganization process should be perceived as a complicated and persistent process, on an organizational, political and ideological level. The task of the reorganization was not just r to draw the curtain over the past crisis, nor to return to the situation before 89-91. We raised the issue of the Party's reinforcement so as to cope with the new historical reality and the new demands. The questions concerning the strengthening of the Party's bonds with the working class, the gathering of social and political forces, the development of the class struggle and people's political consciousness demand -more than ever- an acute response.

As a critical factor for the KKE's further progress, the 16th Congress pinpointed the Party's need for a closer connection to the working class and youth movement -especially the younger ages. The Party decided to reshuffle its forces, giving priority to the building and activity of PBOs in the working class, at the workplaces, the industrial branches, the factories, the movement for education and other fields of strategic importance. Unfolding its activity in the entirety of the working class has always required solid foundations within the working class and youth movement, accordingly.

Since then, many results in that process have been observed. However, there is still need for a more persistent direction of the Party's ideological and political action and Party building on these two crucial fronts -ie the working class and the youth. These serious deficiencies restrained the Party's ability for reinforcement, for mass action and for greater progress in its ability to influence. Party's leakage - noted during the crisis as well as in the first years following it - ceased. There is a need for the Party to increase its membership, to improve its social composition - including the composition of the leading bodies. To develop PBOs in workplaces. In some PBOs, especially in the provinces, there is an urgent need to improve their age composition. The sooner we overcome shortcomings in our action among young people, the better we will achieve our Party's rejuvenation, maintaining continuity and regular succession of experience.

These delays in our work in the working class in the youth made reaching a higher level of militancy and communist training more difficult.

Despite the aforementioned difficulties, throughout the reorganization course -especially after its 16th Congress- Party has developed cadres more mature and experienced in the current needs. They have the capacity to develop and to support the course of reinforcing the Party. At the same time, however, there are a certain number of cadres who fall behind. They cannot adapt to today's demands, they show signs of retreat and exhaustion. A number of cadres and members show weakened militancy, tendencies of retreat. They are consumed by a spirit of typicality and routine.

Of course not only following the 14th Congress but also the 16th there was a noticeable improvement in the guiding ability of the Central Committee's [CC] as well as of the other leading bodies. However, such steps are still inadequate, given the current demands; consequently, this shortcoming reproduces the deficits in the work and operation of the PBOs. PBOs do not work having a comprehensive plan that derives from the general strategy of the Party according to their specific needs and circumstances. Their activities are mainly defined by limited local demands or by the political developments of the moment, lacking any connection to a long term analysis and plan with a perspective. The context of the activity does not focus on a wide range of issues, neither combines a well-balanced ideological, political, collective and organizational texture; there work is poor, fragmentary, following stereotypes and routine practices. It lacks a spirit of initiative.

The Party's collective experience, its documents and analysis on various subjects have not yet been fully assimilated by its members. Rarely such material is used as a manual for PBOs' plan of actions; thus, many regional branches lack a thorough perception of the problems they are invited to deal with; they are influenced by local, false or partial ideas; all kinds of experience -collective, regional, acquired in local branches or the working field- appear to lack inter-relation and interconnection into a creative unity ready to reveal the Party's strategy as a whole in its separate applications.

Certain phenomena of "organizational liberalism" appear limiting the participation of a significant number of party members in the decision-making process or the creative application of the Party resolutions.

The Party's bonds and influence on its allied forces are still weak and temporal. They are strengthened during major political events, but lack follow-up -despite our potential- in periods of the movement's ebb or when it is preparing for its next step.

However, now, as a sign of maturity and progress, we are in a position to point out all unsolved problems that were unsolved at the level of the CC in a detailed way and with a sincere spirit, with no intention to conceal them, but rather confront them, instead.

Objective Factors that Put Obstacles in the Party's course of reorganization

14. We should not underestimate objective factors -and their consequences- that have put obstacles at the course of reorganization. They will continue to exist and their influence will be felt in the future as well.

The forces of KKE and KNE, reduced in number, found themselves ideologically and politically unprepared to deal with the new situation.

New negative effects caused by the capitalist restructuring of labour relations have been affecting all aspects of life, including the people's right to leisure time.

The considerable retreat of the trade union and youth movement have constituted a critical impediment having negatively affected the political behaviour and the collective organized activity of all divisions in the people's movement; such retreat took place mainly in the dawn of the first decade of the 90s.

The ultimate question posed to peoples and their movements is "whose development, for whom and for what purpose". However, it has not been easy for the labour and popular movements -under the given circumstances- to fight back, to reveal the political nature of their demands and combine all forms of actions that rally and their its forces.

As an opposing force to the KKE and the vanguard forces of society, a unified, a firmly founded and multi-targeted enemy has been framed. Its constituent parts are ND and PASOK, which have adopted an identical line of policy and Synaspismos, the main bearer of opportunism. All these forces have joined together and operated -either as one entity or each or separately- in order to slander the communist ideas, socialism, even the Party itself and promoted a corruption of consciousness.

Fighting against entrapment into reactionary ideologies, anti-communist theories and the theories of the "one-ways" promoted throughout the recent years, has always been an impediment to be surmounted.

Subjective Factors, Weaknesses and Impediments in the Course of reorganization

15. After the 14th Congress and throughout its course of reorganization, our Party has been confronted with a series of interrelated subjective factors, weaknesses and impediments that pre-existed but were sharpened during its internal crisis.

Concepts and practices in our political activity -as they were shaped after the restoration of democracy in 1974- have not managed to adapt themselves to current reality. Having outlived their period of flourishing, they were transformed into obstacles blocking the Party's ability to meet current demands.

The majority of the cadres, who have contributed in facing the Party's crisis, have lacked the required experience to boost KKE's ideological, political and operating reorganization within our present reality. Party cadres, as a whole, have inherited old and new problems of a suddenly changing political environment, and have met with considerable obstacles to surmount in the turmoil of capitalist restoration.

In many cases, the incapacity to adapt, poor commitment and false ideas disorient the mass movement's activity and negatively affect the Party's ability to elaborate and promote the Party's strategy on a permanent basis, not only on specific political events.

A relatively large number of the Party cadres scarcely combine financial, ideological and political work into a unified strategy. Such shortcomings have their own effect on the Party's rejuvenation process, the advance of its influence and its ability to reach a conclusion through its course.

All difficulties in adaptation to the current demands of he struggle have been expressed through the pressure that have been exercised on the Party, due to the negative balance of forces and the sense of disappointment and defeatism spread by counterrevolution's imposition.

The aforementioned impediments cannot be merely considered as the outcome of the influence exercised by objective factors. They are also the result of a shallow perception -starting from the Party's CC- of the Party's programme, its policy and strategy, and the lack of a common perception that derives from collective experience and its promotion.

The character of the Front as a social and political alliance of anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly forces invited not only to win achievements but to bring people to power as well- does not penetrate the Party's daily activity.

The struggle for socialism is perceived by our cadres and members as a long term target and not as a daily fight and factor that shapes current activity.

Such weakness should not be prolonged because it reduces the Party's effectiveness. It prepares the ground for divergences toward either right opportunism or toward the "left", in the name of confronting the first which appears to be the main danger presented by imperialism.

The Party's Ideological Political and Operational Advance

16. Today, the Party should enjoy a much more considerable improvement, in terms of its qualitative bonds to peoples and a more advanced position within the mass movement, an increasing influence in elections, if, starting by the CC, it concentrated its forces more intensively and persistently on its major duties, all these years: the substantial and full realization of its elaborate ideological and political unity, confirmed by its theory and practice, the common perception of its strategy's context and its promotion, as well, within current reality.

From the beginning of the Party's restructuring course, the CC should have fulfiled the aforementioned duty in a more demanding way and request intensive progress, for the sake of the division itself and the Party's cadres, as well

In a convincing and cooperative spirit, the required demand toward all cadres to disengage themselves from all concepts and practices irrelevant to the anti-imperialist anti-monopoly struggle should be enforced. Today, such a fight is deeper and more closely related to the anti-capitalist struggle and more tightly linked - under certain conditions - to the socialist transformation.

Throughout the Party's reorganization course, the CC did not opened thoroughly the proper ideological and political front to phenomena of liberalism, sectarianism, defeatism, to tendencies of retreat in face of difficulties. It has not decisively and creatively confronted tendencies of hesitation in the promotion of our strategy, selective response to duties, subjectivism and mechanical repetition of routine practices.

It has not managed to integrate systematically and profit from the accumulated experience and the collective conclusions produced during all this striving during '89 - '91. KKE's historical experience and has not penetrated our daily course. The experiences accumulated from class struggle and people's movements have never fully become a tool in the hands of all Party members.

The CC has not performed its duty to a full extent concerning theoretical development in all Party levels; neither has it provided Party members and cadres with a consistent and systematic program of self-education and a theoretical training on the Party's resolutions.

Concentrating upon the daily pressing demands, it has not managed to focus on the development of its theoretical analysis, to enable the generalizing of the Party's restructuring experience, its course, its operation, its guidelines and the method for its systematic reinforcement.

Bearing its own responsibility, the CC has not succeeded in rendering all Party's members, friends and supporters in full realization of its analyses -which should penetrate their practice- in an attempt to confirm, enrich an improve them, based on the criteria of their practical application.

Despite the Party's limited number of cadres, the effort for their effective engagement into the CC's supplementary committees -including the City Committees and the Regional ones- should be exhausted to achieve amore productive supervision of their activities and a successful deployment of its most qualified forces.

More attention should be drawn to the collective operation of all Party's leading bodies. All leading bodies should be actively involved in the decision - making process, the resolution enforcement and the Party's instructive role.

The performance of the Central Committee elected at the 16th  congress

17. The CC elected by the 16th Congress, dealt with the problem of promoting and applying the Party strategy in practice. It has analyzed, based on current developments and facts, the Party's resolutions, directions and targets in order to respond to the working class' interests and the needs of the anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly fight. It has focused its attention on the elaboration of a systematic permanent and collective political line of action, carried out by the Party in its entirety, while promoting the rallying of forces and the policy of alliances in the mass movement. The promotion of the Party's policy of alliances and cooperation has been one of its major fields of work. The CC has also dealt with the Party's intervention in the international developments, the international communist movement and the movements against the capitalist internationalization.

It has shown noticeable progress in the elaboration of certain major social issues, such as unemployment, social security and the question of economic development. It has improved its analyses in the sectors of Education, Health, Farmers' Policy, Environment and the operation of Municipalities and Prefectures. However all these fields of study are still in need of integrating themselves into a consistent whole, ready to operate both as an entity and as an independent component.

Many analyses carried out by some institutions and or individual scientists are far better used. Statistics and other facts are carefully studied. In many cases, the Party's propaganda was politically mature to intervene into the guiding line that shapes collective activity, on a national or an international scope.

It has continued to promote research on the causes and factors that have led to counter revolution's victory in the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

It has developed the Party's capacity to respond timely to electoral demands. In many cases, its estimations n current political developments have been successfully confirmed.

The CC's resolutions, although politically correct, have not been followed by the proper enforcement policy which would create conditions for achieving a higher level of effectiveness based on the political and ideological unity and of the Party; it has not also managed to promote a unified perception of its strategy in the new political reality, based on our theory and experience.

Under a weak practical spirit, the CC has not sufficiently achieved the orientation of all its bellow divisions -and thus the PBOs- toward a unified operation, based on the Party's strategy; neither has it transmitted to them the ability to apply the Party's strategy creatively according to different needs and demands. Such deficiency bears its own negative results: a diversity of obstacles is concentrated in the PBOs' effort to elaborate a complete schedule of action, confirm, enrich and improve it.

Our performance in our major fields of duties the working class and youth, the improvements of the Party's social composition and the elevation of its political and ideological standard has been poor, comparing to our potentials and people's demands.

It has been the CC's duty to approach all unanswered questions raised by the youth, especially those concerning the shaping of its social and political consciousness; it should be sincerely involved into the youth's current line of thought and behaviour, in order to help all Party's divisions to target their strategy at the heart of the youth's problems.

The aforementioned defects manifest the CC's weakness to combine thoroughly its political resolutions with the proper measures for the Party's concentration and deployment of its forces; to achieve their maximum coordination in the major duties KKE is called to fulfil.

Tie CC has not exhausted all its efforts in training new cadres, on a long term basis; a new leading group to share the experience and the knowledge in order to formally meet with its new duties.

An important factor that has generated these shortcomings is the CC's ineffectiveness to meet with critical demands raised during the 16th Congress: the formation of its departments, which is the infrastructure for the development of more complete analyses, the generalizing of experience, the long term schedule and programming. Instead, the spirit of a mechanically applied routine has been preserved.

Having managed to focus itself on the generalizing of its experience during the Party's reorganization process, its guiding methods and its handing of the Party's development would have been more effective and have provided with us with a more thorough evaluation of its outcome.

The CC's activity has been influenced by the objective obstacles met during the quantitative and qualitative development of its cadres. Such evaluation does not diminish the initial responsibility of this division. It proves that the new CC will be burdened both the duty of training new cadres.

The overall performance of the CC has been negatively influenced by its members' inadequacy to share a more comprehensive picture of the Party's course and development regardless of each one's assigned duty; to intervene through remarks and conclusions in between CC's sessions; to demand more from each one separately in order to improve the CC's overall performance.

The Politburo has improved its ability to elaborate Party's directions concerning current developments and tendencies. It has contributed in the Party's interventions and initiatives. However, it shares its own responsibility for promoting an elevated method for the realization of the Party's policy on the gathering of forces, in the working class and the youth, in the women movement and the freelance professional field.

Despite the Party's limited number of cadres, the Politburo has not decisively contributed in the establishment of supplementary committees at the side of the CC.

It has not shown decisiveness in the development of the Party's ideological and instructive course. It has not, also, firmly promoted individual and specific criticism toward every CC's member, as a mean of critical and productive support.

The CC secretariat has provided PBOs with a more decisive orientation into their fighting process and in the promoting of the gathering of forces policy. Up to a certain extent, it has managed to generalize the Party's experience concerning collective activity and mobilization. It has, also, effectively guided the PBOs during critical political events, such as the elections. But it has not succeeded yet -according to the needs and demands- in focusing its efforts firmly in the improvement of its guiding line context, the basic orientation its activity in the working class and youth movements, accordingly.

The Secretariat of the CC should have encouraged the production of written works as well as discussion during the division's sessions, the study of Party's development.

After its 16th Congress, the Party's financial state has been improved due to the PBOs' effort. Yet, we have not still overcome our basic weakness: to gather all member fees -defined by our Party's Constitution as 1% of each members' total income- regularly on a monthly basis. We are, also, behind securing a permanent fund raising effort by all members on a monthly basis. To regularly gather contributions from Party's friends and supporters to finance its fight. Till now, it is only in major fund raising campaigns that our members exhaust their effort to the fullest. Fund raising, as a Party fighting method, is valuable, not only became of its quantitative results but of its qualitative ones as well, if it is exercised on a systematic basis.

Whatever progress made has not been stabilized yet. Financial needs have been constantly increasing. The Party's income must increase in order to support its propaganda and instructing operation, through all available means, including electronic ones. There is an immense need to contribute to the Party's theoretical research and production as well as its active participation in international events. Thus, the increase in fund raising,, mainly by the PBOs, is of critical importance for the Party's role in the class struggle.

Party's activity should not be impeded by financial difficulties. Instead, financial contribution along with its proper management must become an inseparable element of the Party's course.